Intelligence Collection, Corruption, Ignorance, And Intrusion

hrs_nsa_aerial(Editor’s note: This commentary was originally published at Law and Liberty.) 

When you read that NSA’s capting and sorting most telephone and internet traffic is “America’s main remaining advantage over terror networks,” (the Wall Street Journal editorial, Dec. 17) or that “The effectiveness of data mining is proportionate to the size of the sample” (ibid, June 10), you should know that the writers are as ignorant of what technologies make signals intelligence effective as they are careless of our liberties. Ignorantly, they have swallowed the propaganda of co-dependent bureaucrats at NSA and in industry. Unwittingly, they are shilling for corruption, paid for by intrusion and inefficiency.

In fact, NSA’s equation of communications intelligence with universal capting-and-sorting, a practice that dates to WWII, has been yielding sharply diminishing returns for two generations and has been the subject of debate among the few persons cleared for the details. Having been one of these and having taken part in these internal debates, I am happy now to see these matters exposed to wider attention.

The Presidential Panel on NSA surveillance, by perhaps the most obscure of its recommendations (#20 out of 46), proposed developing “Software that would allow… intelligence agencies more easily to conduct targeted information acquisition rather than bulk-data collection.” That would mean equipping NSA’s universal vacuum-cleaners-of-the-electronic-spectrum with criteria to reject the vast bulk of data that no one envisages ever analyzing. The software would do a kind of pre-analysis.

This recommendation just scratches the surface of a big debate. It starts from the fact that, even in the 1980s, 90 percent of NSA’s communications intelligence budget was devoted to unfocused, universal collection but produced only 50 percent of COMINT reports, while the other half of reports came from targeted collection. Simply, while on-the-air traffic has exploded in volume even as its valuable nuggets have been shielded by unbreakable encryption, even as cheap cellphones have universalized access to “one-time pads” – all of which has reduced the value of universal collection – the technologies that broadly fall under the category of “bugging” have improved by leaps and bounds. Since the technical trends that produced this disparity have been accelerating, NSA has had a harder and harder time justifying its motto: “collect first, think about it later.”

A noteworthy Wall Street Journal story reports that, in 1996, NSA reacted to pressures to shift its multibillion dollar COMINT budget by developing software to sift data within collection systems to avoid recording useless stuff, especially the mountains of American internet traffic that were swamping NSA’s storage capacity. While the advocates of this, called “Thin Thread,” knew that protecting the privacy of Americans would be a side benefit of their work, the efficiency of intelligence was the program’s primary objective.

However, by the time the software had been developed in 1999 for all of $3 million, NSA’s leadership decided to throw it away. The decision seems to have proceeded from the straightforward logic of bureaucracy: this small step toward targeted collection could have been a first step away from the any number of multi-billion dollar programs for bulk collection and storage. These are programs in which countless officials have build careers within the agency, programs that offer these officials the post-retirement jobs by which they cash in on their service; programs whose contractors are major contributors to members of the House and Senate Intelligence committees.

My own experience on the Senate Intelligence Committee staff is consistent with the program team’s contention that the program’s abandonment was due to the contractors’ lobbying. Again and again, senators and staff would agree to redirect programs away from established priorities, or to trim them on the basis of reasoning about what would produce better intelligence, only to be turned around by standard lobbying from teams of officials and contractors. The juggernaut continued to roll, directed by money and careers, careers and money.

The post-9/11 environment let this back-scratching combination cover itself with the claim that “more” collection and capacity to look into more nooks and crannies is a viable substitute for good judgment about where you should be looking – to put it bluntly, for explicit profiling.

That claim is the reverse of the truth. In fact, mere expansion of collection leads naturally to focusing on the data that is available most easily and plentifully. That happens to be data on ordinary Americans. That is why federal agencies scramble for access to NSA’s trove in order the better to enforce their burgeoning regulations. Security bureaucrats being as lazy as any other kind, they will find “suspects” where the finding is easy – by profiling of the implicit kind.

As our ruling class applies the term “terrorist” ever more promiscuously and conveniently to its own domestic competitors, it would be surprising were data gathered by mere inertia resulting from garden-variety corruption not used for the most nefarious of purposes.

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Angelo M. Codevilla is professor emeritus of international relations at Boston University. He served as a U.S. Senate Staff member dealing with oversight of the intelligence services. His book Peace Among Ourselves and With All Nations is forthcoming from Hoover Institution Press.

Bad Intelligence Is Worse Than None

Embasy Closings 300x187 Bad Intelligence Is Worse Than None

The US government shut down all US embassies in the Middle East for the first weekend in August and notified all US persons traveling abroad that they face extra danger of being set upon by terrorists. Because, says the official announcement, US Intelligence detected “increased chatter” among suspected terrorists that contained “specific threats.” The closings and warnings are dreadful policy. The intelligence on the basis of which the policy was made suffers from a lack of quality control – counterintelligence in the language of the trade – so serious as to expose US policy makers to being manipulated by foreign enemies.

The US intelligence community’s aversion to quality control is congenital. From its very inception in the 1940s, US intelligence has dealt with the imbalance between the many certainties demanded of it and the paucity of the facts it can supply by not asking too many questions about its sources’ reliability, passing on what it gets and calling it good. Neither with regard to technical sources such as communications intercepts any more than for human sources is there any independent evaluation about “operational security” – namely for devaluing or discarding sources the existence of which is known to the targets of the collection.

For example, in the wake of the Aldrich Ames espionage case, CIA’s Inspector General found that senior officers continued to pass to US Presidents reports coming from Soviet/Russian sources even after they had become convinced that those sources had come under hostile control. This attitude results not only in bad policy but also in getting people killed. On December 30 2009 seven CIA officers were blown to bits in Afghanistan by a source on whom they had relied for a year and a half for targeting drone strikes.

On the technical side, while on the staff of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I witnessed NSA’s (deplorably) successful effort to continue to use a communications intelligence satellite after its existence and function had been revealed by a combination of a British spy and a New York Times article.

The embassy shutdowns and the traveler warnings resulted from intercepts of terrorist communications devices – phones and computer links that the terrorists surely knew are being monitored. That knowledge long predates the recent publicity – revelation is the wrong term – about NSA’s reach into the electronic spectrum.

The shutdown and warnings, then, proceed from the assumption either that the terrorists “chatter” amongst themselves blissfully ignorant of what anyone who cares to look knows about NSA’s reach, or that they willfully warn us.  That assumption flies in the face of experience. The terrorists who have bitten us have not chattered, while those who chatter do not bite. The terrorists who brought mortars and grenade launchers to destroy US facilities in Benghazi and kill our people did not chatter. The US government is up against serious people. Unfortunately, it gives proof of unseriousness.

The US government’s assertion that the “threats” emanating from this “chatter” were somehow “specific” belies itself because it is contrary to common sense. Any specificity would focus attention on specific people and places rather than eliciting meaningless general measures and warnings. That attention’s effectiveness would depend on secret preparations for counter strokes, not on public displays of fear.

This leads reasonable persons to conclude that some enemies of the United States, well knowing that NSA is listening, decided to give it an earful, with a few names and places thrown in by way of example, but not enough to remove the impression they sought to give of general mayhem. And so they ‘chattered.” They had sound reason to believe that US intelligence executives would trigger equally incompetent policy makers, fearful of being blamed for an attack on their watch preceded by such “chatter.”

The lesson to be taken from all this is that the NSA’s well-known (because of the nature of modern technology) capacity to intrude and manipulate electronic communications – but only those that are not thoughtfully guarded – combined with lack of quality control, leaves it at the mercy of any of its targets that wish to feed it disinformation and then to watch the US government’s self-discrediting reactions.

Alas, the lesson as well is that we who neither want to nor can hide our communications, nor to play games, are helpless if and when senior US officials’ incompetent (or worse) designation of enemies, combined with US intelligence’s lack of quality control, ends up making us the objects of bureaucrats’ games.

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Photo Credit:  Standard Compliant